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We estimate the effect of democratic transitions on agricultural protection in a sample of 74 
developing and developed countries, observed in the 1955-2005 period. We employ both 
differences-in-differences regressions and semi-parametric matching methods, exploiting the 
time series and cross-sectional variation in the data. Our semi-parametric matching estimates 
show that parametric methods might underestimate the true effect of democracy on 
agricultural protection. We find a strong increase in agricultural protection (reduce in 
taxation) after a country transition to democracy. Specifically a democratic transition 
increases agricultural protection by about 9 percent points. However, the effect is asymmetric 
as the effect of leaving democracy on protection is close to zero. The evidence supports the 
redistributive nature of democratic institutions toward the majority and, therefore, it is not 
inconsistent with the median voter model of political behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade the idea that political institutions matter for the economic policy making 
has gained growing emphasis in the economic literature. Institutions, by shaping the rules 
of the game, determine the context in which key functions of government, like 
redistribution of income and the provision of public goods, are undertaken (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003). However, actual theory offers two contrasting views about the effect of 
democratic institutions on public policy outcomes. Indeed, moving from voting models to 
positive theories of public policy we reach a completely different view (see Mulligan et al. 
2004).  
  Models based on the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957) emphasized that in 
democracies the distribution of political power is more equal than the distribution of 
income and wealth. As a consequence, voting models predict that democracies tend to 
redistribute from the rich to the poor, and this will be exacerbated by the level of income 
inequality as the middle-class have more incentive to form coalition with the poor (see 
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Influential political economy 
models based on this logic are those by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 2006) that indeed 
predict redistribution from the elite to the citizen after an extension of voting rights. A 
similar mechanisms that can induce different fiscal policy across democracy and 
autocracy are those proposed by Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson and (1996). The 
idea is that in democracies the tax rates are lower because people can voice against it. 
Differently, the aim of the autocrat is to maximize the tax rate so that he can get highest 
amount of resource to devote to his private interest. Hence, autocracies in contraposition 
to democracies tend to tax more and spend less for general public goods.
1  
A completely different view can be found in the positive theory of public policy (e.g. 
Wittman, 1989) as well as in the ‘Chicago school’ of political economy (Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983). Here the voting process represents only one, and often not 
the most important, mechanism that affects public policy. Indeed, what matters as a key 
determinant of policy is efficiency. Political factors such as elections and voting rules are 
presumed either to be unimportant or just reactions to efficiency considerations. These 
                                                 
1 Other models that emphasize a central role for political institutions in the economic policy-making are 
those developed in the recent comparative politics literature (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). However, as 
their focus is on differences in the forms of democracy, they are less useful to understand differences in 
government policies between democracies and autocracies. 
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approaches stress that the key determinants of the policy-making are economic and 
demographic factors, such as interest group structure, urban location and the technology 
of tax collection, through their effects on both the public interest and the effectiveness of 
interest groups. Thus, when those factors are controlled for, differences in political 
regimes, if any, have only second order effects on policy outcomes (Mulligan et al. 2004).  
Economic and policy consequences of democratic/autocratic institutions have recently 
received  much attention in the literature. It is now well known that linkages between 
democracy and growth, when studied across-countries, are ambiguous and inconclusive 
(see Barro, 1997; Glaeser et al. 2004). However, a growing literature exploiting the within 
country variation in the data and difference-in-differences methodology (Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2008; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2006) also in combination with semi-parametric methods (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2007), shows that the effect of democracy on growth tends to be positive and 
large in magnitude
2. Other important contributions to the strand of literature dealing with 
the impact of political regime on public policies include, among others, Besley et al. 
(2007), Acemoglu (2005), Banerji and Ghanem (1997) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2006). 
The former two papers, provide some theoretical considerations regarding public goods 
provision. The latter two, on the other hand, represent examples of a rich empirical 
literature studying the effect of democracy on public policy outcomes. In this context, 
Banerji and Ghanem (1997) show cross-country evidence supporting the view that 
authoritarian regimes are associated with higher trade protectionism and greater labor 
market distortions. Belsey and Kudamatsu (2006) on the other hand, using panel data find 
that health policy interventions are superior in democracies.  
When dealing with the influence of political regimes on policy outcomes, it is 
important to note a close relationship between the emergence of democratic institutions, 
the structure of the economy, and the role of agricultural sector in particular. For example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) emphasize that democracy is more likely when the elites 
are industrialists rather than landowners.
3 Comparing this view with the one that perceives 
democracy as a concession from authoritarian ruler to raise taxation (Acemoglu and 
                                                 
2 On the positive effect of democracy and growth, see also the recent contribution of Aghion et al. (2007), 
that stresses how political rights induce positive growth, especially in more advanced sectors. Differently, 
on the long-run interplay between income and democracy see the contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2008) and 
of Gundlach and Paldam (2008). 
3 Already Moore (1966) and Dahl (1971) pointed that democracy was not feasible in agrarian societies and 
could emerge only where agricultural land commercialised and was no longer of feudal character.   5
Robinson, 2006) implies that transition to democracy may result in significant shift in 
agricultural policies.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues further by reconsidering the link 
between democracy and trade policies using a rich dataset on agricultural policy 
distortions recently developed by the World Bank (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008). 
The data cover a sample of 74 developing and developed countries in the period from 
1955 to 2005. By exploiting the panel dimensions of the dataset we investigate whether 
the effect of regime changes – transitions from autocracy to democracy and vice-versa – 
systematically affect the taxation/subsidization patterns in agriculture protection. The key 
idea behind our empirical approach is to exploit both the cross-country and time series 
variation in the data (see Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005). Specifically, we study the effect 
of democratic reforms using a difference-in-difference technique, as well as by combining 
it with propensity score matching methods along the line first introduced by Persson and 
Tabellini (2007).  
Several recent papers have investigated how democracy affect economic (trade) 
liberalization at aggregated level. For example, de Haan and Sturm (2003) working on a 
developing country sample, show that greater political freedom furthers economic 
freedom. Similarly, Milner and Kubota (2005) show that regime change towards 
democracy is associated with more trade liberalization in developing countries. More 
general evidence on the relationship between regime changes and economic (trade) 
liberalization can be found in Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson (2005). The 
former, using difference-in-difference estimation, show that economic liberalization tend 
to precede political liberalization, and not vice-versa. The latter, using a similar estimation 
strategy, shows that what matters is not the dichotomy between democracy and autocracy, 
but the form of democracy. The majority of this literature focused on how democracy 
affects policy (and vice versa) at the aggregated level. Differently, our focus here is at the 
industry level. This difference in focus could be important as one of the key 
transformation with economic development is through structural change. Thus, because 
democracy and development go hand in hand, focusing (only) at aggregate level could 
mask several potential sources of variation in the economic and political forces. 
In the context of agricultural policy outcomes, all previous evidence but one, exploit 
especially the cross-country variation in the data showing mixed and often weak evidence 
on the effect of democracy on agricultural protection (see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994;   6
Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper, 2001)
4. Differently, Swinnen et al. (2001), exploiting the 
within-country variation show that only those democratic reforms that determine a 
significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests – e.g. the extension 
of voting rights to small farmers in Belgium in the early 20th century – induced an 
increase in agricultural protection.
5  
Our approach has a number of attractive features. First, in contrast to cross-country 
studies the difference-in-difference approach allows us to overcome several strong 
identifying assumption typically made by previous literature investigating the relationship 
between democracy and public policy (e.g. Mulligan et al. 2004). Second, as the more 
recent micro-econometric literature have questioned the results obtained from the standard 
difference-in-difference procedure (see, e.g., Abadie, 2005), by combining it with 
propensity score matching we are able to investigate the causal effect of democracy on 
public policy, an issue rarely covered by existing empirical studies. Third, our endogenous 
variable, agricultural distortions, represent a comprehensive measure of all the distortions 
that affect the agricultural industry. From this point of view, it represents an improvement 
with respect to similar papers that have used as endogenous variable openness index (e.g. 
Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) largely criticized in the literature (see Rodriquez and 
Rodrik, 2001). The last point is important, as the more recent evidence on the interplay 
between democracy and trade policy have emphasized the sensitivity of the results on how 
openness is measured (see Tavares, 2007).  
The evidence reported in this paper strongly suggests that democratization matters for 
the orientation of agricultural policies. Controlling for both observed and unobserved 
source of heterogeneity we find a robust positive effect of transition into democracy on 
agricultural protection. Our results show that standard difference-in-difference approach 
might underestimate the true effect of a democratic reform. In particular, the average 
positive effect of a transition to democracy on agricultural protection is about 9 percent 
points when semi-parametric methods are used, but it drops to about 5 percent points 
when standard difference-in-difference regression is applied. Moreover, the relationship is 
                                                 
4 Important precursors of this kind of analyses can be found in the works of Bates (1983; 1989) on agrarian 
development in African countries. Moreover, the relationship between democracy and agricultural 
protection was first highlighted by Lindert (1991), who in a cross-country analysis found a positive 
relationship when democracy was associated with rapid agricultural decline. Other relevant institutional 
dimensions like ideology, land inequality and electoral rules are investigated by Olper and Raimondi (2004), 
Olper (2007), Thies and Porche (2007) and Henning (2008). However, given our focus on democratic 
reforms, we do not further discuss these interesting lines of research. 
5 This result is important as it highlights the importance of drawing inferences from regime changes to more 
carefully capture the effect of democratization on protection (Swinnen, 2008).   7
asymmetric as the effect of leaving democracy on protection is close to zero. Overall, the 
results strongly confirm the redistributive nature of democratic institutions toward the 
majority and, therefore, it is not inconsistent with the median voter model of political 
behaviour. Moreover, our evidence rises an important question whether the strong 
taxation/subsidization switch induced on agricultural policy by democratization, could 
represent one of the channels through which democracy exerts its positive effect on 
growth. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) presents and justifies our 
empirical strategy summarizing the pros and cons of difference-in-difference regressions 
and the potential advantages of propensity score matching techniques. Section (3) 
carefully describes and motivates how we measure reforms into and out of democracy, 
and presents the data and the basic empirical specification. In Section (4) the empirical 
results are presented and discussed. Finally, Section (5) concludes.  
2. Methodology 
This section presents our empirical strategy finalized to estimate the causal effect of 
democracy on agricultural protection. As summarized before, the existing literature 
studying the effect of political institutions on agricultural policy has exploited especially 
the cross-country variation in the data. The well know problem with this approach is that 
the estimated correlation could reflect an omitted variable bias or reverse causation. In 
theory, a potential solution to this problem is to find good instruments and run two stage 
last square regressions. However, this strategy is problematic in our context because good 
instruments for regime changes are not easily available (see Persson and Tabellini, 2007). 
Most importantly, though, cross-country regressions leaves out important information 
from the time variation in the data (see Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). Indeed, as it is clear 
from figure 1 that maps the dynamics of agricultural protection averaged across 
democracy and autocracy, there exists considerable variation over time in our sample.  
A second possibility is to estimate panel regressions. Here the advantage is to exploit also 
the time dimension in the data. However, as stressed by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2007) traditional panel data approach relies on too restrictive and 
untestable identifying assumptions when studying the effect of regime changes on 
economic or policy outcomes, taking the form of exclusion restrictions (see below). Thus, 
following recent tendencies in the comparative political economy literature we estimate 
the average effect of democracy on policy outcomes relying on micro-econometric   8
approach, using difference-in-difference regressions also in combination with semi-
parametric matching methods. 
2.1 Differences-in-differences regressions 
Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we define regime transitions or democratic 
reforms as a ‘treatment’ experienced by some countries but not others. Then we estimate 
the effect of the treatment through a difference-in-difference regression. In this way we 
are able to exploit both the time series and cross-sectional variation in the data. Indeed, in 
our sample we include both countries that experience a regime transitions in the observed 
period, called the treated, and the countries that do not experience any reforms, called the 
controls. In the regression we compare agricultural protection in the treated countries, 
before and after the treatment, with the agricultural protection of the control group of 
countries that do not experience any reforms in the period of analysis. In this way we 
exploit both the within country variation and the comparison between groups (treated and 
control) of countries.  
More formally, this means running panel regressions with the following specification: 
         t i t i t i t i t i D Y , , , , ε θ α ρ β + + + + = X                      (1) 
where Yi,t  denotes our measure of interest, namely agricultural protection, αi and θt are 
respectively the country and year fixed effects, Xi,t is a set of control variables, and Di,t is 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 under democracy and 0 otherwise. The parameter β 
is the difference-in-difference estimate of the reform effect. It is obtained by comparing 
average protection after democratic transition, minus protection before the transition in the 
treated countries, to the change in protection in the control countries over the same period 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2007). Here the control countries are those that do not experience 
a transition into or out of democracy, thus those that have either Di,t = 1 or Di,t = 0 over 
the entire sample period. We use regression (1) to estimate the average effect of 
democratization on agricultural protection.  
As stressed by Persson (2005), one problem with the interpretation of the specification 
(1) is the correct econometric identification. Specifically, the coefficient β identifies the 
causal effect of democratic transitions, only if countries in the various reform groups do 
not have trends in Y which are different from those in the control group but unrelated to 
reforms. As we will show later, the frequency of transitions into democracy (autocracy) 
change quite a lot across continents. Thus, to avoid confounding such non-random   9
incidence with continents-specific trends in agricultural protection, we ensure that the 
estimates of β
  are robust to the inclusion of a set of continent-time interaction effects. 
A final econometric problem arises when the dependent variable displays a strong 
positive autocorrelation. In that circumstance, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the 
estimated standard errors with difference-in-difference approach are strongly 
underestimated. To overcome this issue, we follow the most conservative method of 
estimating standard error by clustering at the country level, allowing arbitrary country-
specific serial correlation. Moreover, we also estimate regressions with added the lagged 
dependent variable. This transforms specifications (1) into a dynamic panel model where 
the lagged dependent variable allows for the strong persistence in agricultural protection. 
2.2 Propensity score matching 
As noted in the literature, estimates obtained from the standard difference-in-difference 
procedure are based on two main restrictive assumptions (see, e.g., Abadie, 2005; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2007). First, it is assumed that in the control and treated countries, absent 
any regime change, the average growth in protection in the treated countries should be the 
same as in control countries. This is obviously a strong assumption.
6  
The second restriction is related to (potential) heterogeneity in the democracy effect 
on agricultural protection. In that case the unexplained component of protection, εi,t, also 
includes the term (βi,t – β)Di,t, where βi,t is the country-specific effect of democracy in 
country  i and year t. This occurs any time a reform into democracy is, among other 
relevant factors, due to the protection effect of the democratic transition itself, namely 
when Di,t = 1 is more likely when βi,t > β (see, e.g., Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and 
Card, 1985).  
To circumvent this issue the existing literature often interacts the democracy dummy 
with other specific characteristics of the reforms, such as the specific electoral rules or 
forms of government implemented by the new democracy (see Persson, 2005; Olper and 
Raimondi, 2009). However, as suggested by Persson and Tabellini (2007), the problem 
here is that the potential interactions or non-linearity are too numerous, relative to the few 
democratic transitions. In these circumstances, semi-parametric methods could provide an 
elegant solution to these problems.  
                                                 
6 This restriction is obviously partially tackled by adding several covariates in the vector Xi,t, with the aim to 
increase the ‘similarity’ between treated and control countries. 
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Accordingly, to have better insights on the effect of political regime transition on the 
level of agricultural protection we combine difference-in-differences with propensity 
score matching method. As such we follow the approach discussed by Smith and Todd 
(2005) and Abadie (2005) and applied by Blundell et al. (2004) and Persson and Tabellini 
(2007). The focus by the propensity score matching is to employ methods that would 
allow to rule out the impact of unobservable factors and to relax linearity (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Otherwise the effect of political regime 
transition may be easily confounded with that of the factors determining this shift. Since 
one does not observe what would have happened if the democratic country had remained 
in autocracy (or the converse), an estimate of the counterfactual is constructed. 
Conditional on number of observable characteristics the probability of regime change is 
calculated for each country, the propensity score. Based on this estimate, the next step 
involves evaluating the difference in the evolution of agricultural protection between the 
countries with and without a regime change. Since matching relies on comparing 
countries with similar values of propensity score the inferences are not distorted by 
counterfactuals very different from the treated observations.  
More formally this approach could be presented as follows. Denote by D = {0, 1} the 
treatment indicator, equal to 1 for treated countries, i.e. those that made transition to 
democracy (autocracy); and equal to 0 for control countries, i.e. those that remained 
autocracies (democracies) throughout the period for which data on agricultural protection 
are available. Let 
D
t i Y ,  represents the level of agricultural protection in country i in time t 
and democratic state D. Let t = 0 corresponds to the period before the change in political 
regime, and t = 1 corresponds to the period after transition. Finally denote by Xi,t a set of 
observable characteristics. Following Heckman et al. (1997), Abadie (2005) and Smith 
and Todd (2005) our outcome of interest could be represented as follows:  








1 , = − = = − i i i i i i i i D Y Y E D Y Y E X X .                        (2) 
The left-hand side is the unobserved average change in agricultural protection in control 
countries had they change their political regime. The right-hand side is the actual change 
in agricultural protection in those countries. This formula represents the so-called 
‘conditional mean independence’, which states that, conditional on the vector X, the 
outcomes are independent of the selection process. In other words, if countries from the 
control group (D = 0) were treated, their outcome in terms of change in agricultural   11
protection, once conditioned on X, would not differ from the expected value of outcomes 
in the treated group.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that instead of conditioning on the X vector one 
can condition on propensity score P(X) which is the probability of selection conditioned 
on X,  
p(Xi) = Prob (Di,1 = 1|Xi). 
Provided that the probability of treatment is strictly greater than 0 and less than 1, that is, 
0 < Prob(Di,1 = 1|Xi) < 1, each treated observation have the potential of an analogue in the 
control group. This assures that the impact of treatment is only valid for observations not 
violating the common support assumption. In these circumstances our outcome of interest 
becomes: 








1 , = − = = − i i i i i i i i D p Y Y E D p Y Y E X X .                  (3) 
The set of covariates X is chosen to reduce the bias attributable to unobserved factors and 
thus is crucial for the quality of matching (see Becker and Ichino, 2002). Basically, 
reducing the bias should be accomplished by using diversity of the conditioning variables. 
However, in macroeconomic setting, i.e. in our context, where the sample is relatively 
small dropping too many observations due to violation of the so-called common support 
assumption (when the treatment is predicted too well) would not be desirable.  
In this context, following Persson and Tabellini (2007), we decided to use limited 
number of covariates that are likely to influence both regime change and level of 
agricultural protection. The same variables are used when estimating the effect of 
democratic transitions as well as when estimating the effect of autocratic transitions (more 
on this below).  
We use several control countries, to act as the matches for a treated country. The idea 
is to calculate the average propensity score from a neighbourhood of propensity scores of 
several control countries, match this average propensity score to the propensity score of a 
treated country, and then obtain the average treatment effect. Two matching estimators 
were used, namely Epanechnikov kernel and Gaussian kernel (Fan, 1992; Heckman et al., 
1997; 1998). The average estimated effect of regime transitions that we compute could be 
presented as follows: 








        ( 4 )    12
where I stands for number of treated observations within the common support; ai is the 
difference between average level of agricultural protection after and before the transition 
in the treated country i; 
j
i a  is the difference between average level of agricultural 
protection in the control country j over the periods before and after the transition date in 
the treated country it is matched with; and wij (wij > 0 and ∑ j wij = 1) are weights based on 
the propensity score and depend on the matching estimator (Sianesi, 2001).  
We allow the effect of democratic transition to differ from the effect of autocratic 
transition and therefore we treat transitions from autocracy to democracy separately from 
transitions from democracy to autocracy. Countries that experience transitions in both 
directions are used in both these estimations however with different time coverage. For 
instance, Philippines enter the autocratic transition sample for the period 1962-1985 (with 
the shift occurring in 1972) and the democratic transition sample for the period 1972-2005 
(with the shift occurring in 1986).  
3. Data, sample and basic specification 
The sample refers to 74 countries, comprising yearly data from 1955 to 2005 (see Table 
A.1). Not every country fulfils the whole time period, and the average number of years of 
observation per country is 35. Overall we worked with an unbalanced panel with more 
than 2,500 observations.  
3.1 Democratic reforms and their determinants  
In classifying reform episodes, the most recent literature is followed (see Giavazzi and 
Tabellini, 2005; Persson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2007; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 
2008). Recent studies investigating the effect of democracy largely rely on the composite 
Polity2 index from Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaeggers, 2007).  
Countries are classified into democracy or autocracy using the Polity2 index. This 
index assigns a value ranging from -10 to +10 to each country and year, with higher 
values associated with better democracies on the basis of several institutional 
characteristics like the openness of elections, or constraints on the executive. We code a 
country as democratic in each year that the Polity2 index is strictly positive, setting a 
binary indicator called democracy = 1 (0 otherwise). A reform into (or out of) democracy 
occurs in a country-year when this democracy indicator switches from 0 to 1 (and vice 
versa). While in theory other democracy database, like the Freedom House data, could be 
used, we follow the common practise of using the Polity2 index for both comparability   13
and practical reasons. Indeed, it is the only data source that allows to maximise the 
number of usable political reforms in our dataset. For example, using the Freedom House 
data, quite apart from its shortcomings due to classification bias (see Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2008), strongly limits the number of usable transitions because the 
information start only in 1972.
7 
Overall, applying these criteria to the dataset, we reach 67 transitions into or out of 
democracy, of which 41 are transition into democracy and 27 are into autocracy (see 
Table A.1). The distribution of these reforms is quite uniform over time (53% before 
1985) but not across continents: about 50% of the reforms are in Africa, 28% in Asia, 
18% in Latin America.  
To start, following Persson and Tabellini (2007), we introduce the criteria that the 
outcome of interest, agricultural protection, be observed for at least four years before and 
after each reform episode. Thus, by treating the first and last four year observations as 
missing values, the effective number of reform episodes used in the empirical analysis 
will be lower, and around to 40.
8 
In order to implement our matching strategy we need variables determining the shift in 
political regimes. These are as follows. Variable initial polity2 takes the value of our 
democracy index polity2 at the beginning of the sample. This variable is included to take 
into account that countries with polity2 taking values close to zero are more likely to 
change the regime. To control for the fact that the sample period varies in length across 
countries and that the length of sample may be (positively) correlated with the probability 
of changes in the political regime, we include also a variable length of sample (measured 
in years). To capture the level of economic development a variable relative gdp is 
included. It measures each country’s per capita income at the beginning of the sample 
relative to US per capita income in the same year.  
Finally, to take into account that change in political regime could be closely related to 
the occurrence of conflicts (both internal as well as inter-state) we include also a variable 
conflict years which measures the fraction of conflict years over the total period length for 
                                                 
7 The other usable data source on democratic transitions with a good overlapping with our sample, is that of 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), that indeed cover the period from 1960 to 2005. However, as shown by 
the same authors, the differences between their transition data and those based on the Polity index are minor, 
and do not affect the regression results and conclusion. For a critical discussion of democracy indices, see 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002). 
8 It is important to note that by relaxing this criteria to only two years of observable outcomes, and using 
almost all the reform episodes reported in Table A.1, the regression results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively the same. The only notable difference is a slight lower magnitude of the democracy effect, as 
now the sample include several doubtful or partial reform episodes.   14
which data on agricultural protection are available. These data come from the UCD/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2008 (see Gleditsch et al. 2002).  
3.2 Dependent variable and other covariates 
We test our hypotheses using two different dependent variables: the agricultural nominal 
rate of assistance (NRA) and the relative rate of assistance (RRA), both from the World 
Bank Agdistortions Database (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008 for calculation details). 
The NRA to agriculture is measured as the weighted average of the nominal assistance at 
the product level, using as a weight the industry’s value share of each product. 
Differently, the RRA is calculated as the ratio between the agricultural and non-
agricultural NRA.
9 One advantage of using also the RRA, is that especially in developing 
countries, one important source of indirect taxation to agriculture comes from protection 
of manufacturing sectors. Thus, the RRA  is a more useful indicator in undertaking 
international comparison over time of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an 
anti- or pro-agricultural bias (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008). Moreover, by 
comparing the differentiated effect induces by democratic reforms on NRA instead on 
RRA, allows us to better understand which kind of liberalization/protectionism effect 
dominate in driving the results. 
Figure 1 (and Table 1), displays the evolution of average levels of the nominal rate of 
assistance in the full sample (dotted line), and splits the sample across autocracy and 
democracy. Several interesting patterns emerge. First, autocratic countries have, on 
average, as well as in each year considered, a negative level of agricultural protection. 
Thus agriculture in these countries is always taxed at an average period rate of −15%. The 
opposite applies to democratic countries, that are always strongly protected at an average 
rate of 45%, though at a decreasing rate starting from the mid-eighties. Moreover, part of 
the reduction in democracy protection in the last twenty years, other than to external 
constraints like WTO, appears potentially determined by countries that have experienced a 
transition toward democracy. Indeed, as emerges from an inspection of Figure 1, the 
yearly average protection level (dotted line) is progressively closer to the level of 
protection in the democracies sample. 
In the empirical specification we also include additional controls that are likely to 
affect the level of agricultural protection, as suggested by many previous studies (e.g. 
                                                 
9 Specifically, RRA is calculated as [(1 − NRAag)/(1 − NRAnonag)-1], where NRAag is the nominal assistance to 
agriculture and NRAnonag is the nominal assistance to non-agricultural sectors.   15
Anderson, 1995; Beghin, and Kherallah, 2004; Swinnen et al 2000; Olper, 2001). 
Specifically, our basic difference-in-difference specification always includes the 
following structural controls: the level of development gdppc, measured by the log of real 
per capita GDP; the share of agricultural employment in total employment, empsh; the log 
of agricultural land per capita, landpc; the log of total population, lpop; and, finally, given 
the high persistency of agricultural protection and for reasons discussed above, in some 
specification we also include the lagged dependent variable. All these variables are 
computed starting from FAO and World Bank (WDI) sources, or from national statistics. 
4. Estimation results 
4.1 Differences-in-differences estimates 
Table 2 displays the results of specification (1) estimated across different samples. 
This corresponds to a standard difference-in-differences estimation on yearly data. The 
specification, except for country and year fixed effects and the covariates defined above, 
always includes interaction effects between continent and year dummies to control for 
both differences in regional protection dynamics and the non-stationary nature of the 
democracy dummy. Indeed, as emphasized by Papaioannou and Siourounis, (2008), our 
democracy  indicator tend to exhibit a trending behaviour, because when a country 
experience a (successful) transition to democracy, the probability of a reversion to 
autocracy is low. Following Persson and Tabellini (2007), regressions of Table 2 
experiment with different assumptions about the treatments and the control group, testing 
the effect of a democratic transition on different samples. Thanks to this we also test the 
robustness of the results.
10 To simplify the interpretation of the results, we express NRA 
(and  RRA) as a percentage. Thus, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on our 
democracy dummy measures the average percentage point changes in agricultural 
protection implied by a transition into (or out of) democracy. 
Regression (1) imposes the assumption that the effect on protection of a transition to 
democracy is the same as the negativity of the effect of a transition to autocracy, thus 
exploiting the full sample. The coefficient on democracy is positive and significant at 1% 
                                                 
10 The sign and significance of other covariates used in these specifications (results not shown) are as 
follow. First, and not surprisingly, agricultural protection is positively and significantly associated with the 
level of development (GDP per capita). Moreover, protection is positively related to the log of population, 
and negatively to both the land per capita and the employment share of agriculture. However, it is important 
to note that the last variables are insignificant in several specifications, suggesting that in the previous 
analyses they especially capture the cross-country variation in protection, here subsumed in the fixed 
effects.   16
level, meaning that a transition into democracy induces an increase in agricultural 
protection of about 14 percent points. Thus the effect is not only statistically significant, 
but also important from an economic point of view.  
Regression (2) estimates only the effect of a transition into democracy, removing 
reforms to autocracy from the sample, and using as control group only permanent 
autocracies. The democracy coefficient is again positive, but drops somewhat in 
magnitude and it is now significant at only 10 percent level by using clustered standard 
errors. In regression (3), by adding also permanent democracies to the control group, the 
coefficient on the democracy dummy increases and turns out to be significant at 1 percent 
level. Now the estimate implies that a democratic transition induces a protection growth 
effect of about 15 percent points. Regression (4) estimates the effect of a transition out of 
democracy (or into autocracy), using permanent democracies as the control group. Here 
the democracy coefficient is negative, thus going in an opposite direction with respect to 
our prior,
11 but it is statistically insignificant. Thus, we have evidence that the reform 
effect is asymmetric, indeed leaving democracy do not affect the level of protection.  
Columns (5) to (9), replicate the same battery of regressions using as dependent 
variable the RRA. In general term, the pattern of the results are quite comparable, but with 
some notable exceptions. First of all, the magnitude of the positive effect on protection of 
reforms into democracy is significantly lower with a range from about 5 to 9 percent 
points. In same cases the democracy coefficient is not statistically significant when 
clustered standard errors are used. The democracy coefficient is always positive and 
significant when the treatment measures transitions toward democracy, and the control 
group also includes the permanent democracies. However, when the control group 
includes only permanent autocracies, we observe a reduction in the magnitude of the 
democracy effect that is now significant only using not clustered standard errors. 
Similarly as before, a transition out of democracy never affects significantly the level of 
agricultural protection. Finally and interesting, note that the lower magnitude of 
democracy coefficient on RRA  with respect to NRA regressions, suggests that what 
matters after a regime change is a genuine agricultural policy reforms, instead of policy 
reforms into non agricultural industry. Otherwise, we would find exactly the opposite 
result. 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that here we are measuring the negative protection effect of a transition away from 
democracy.   17
Summarizing, this preliminary evidence suggests that the effect of transition to 
democracy induces an increase in agricultural protection that vary from about 10-14% 
using NRA, to about 5-9% using RRA. Thus, agriculture, that is discriminated and taxed in 
an autocratic country, after a democratic transition will take advantage of a redistribution 
process, a result consistent with historical evidence reported in Lindert (1994), Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000), and Swinnen et al. (2001). An important implication of these results 
come by the fact that the average and the median values of the share of agricultural 
population in countries undergoing democratic transitions is higher than 50%. Thus, the 
evidence supports the notion that democratic institutions tend to redistribute toward the 
majority and, therefore, it is consistent with the median voter model of political behavior. 
Moreover, the fact that the same relation does not hold for transition out of democracy, 
appears consistent with several stylized facts suggesting that, once implemented, 
agricultural policies tend to persist for some time, even if changes in (external) conditions 
made them ‘inefficient’, or not politically justifiable (see Olper and Swinnen, 2008).  
Finally, to check the robustness of our evidence, Table 3 presents results of the 
dynamic version of the equation (1), estimating autoregressive specifications that control 
for the persistency in agricultural protection. Note that, although the joint presence of 
fixed effects and the lagged protection level could yield inconsistent estimates, our large 
time period (35 years for the average countries) strongly reduces this potential source of 
bias (see Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008).
12  
As expected, agricultural protection is highly persistent over time, namely actual 
protection is an important predictor of future protection. This version of the model shows 
an expected smaller magnitude of the democracy effect, as now the large part of the 
dynamics in protection is captured by the lagged depended variable. The increase in 
protection after a democratization episode is about 4-5% for NRA and 3-4% for RRA, and 
their significance levels are very close, and sometime higher, than in the static versions. 
Once again, we have clear evidence that the reform effect is asymmetric: a transition 
toward autocracy do not affect the level of protection. Thus, overall, these additional 
results give a strong confirmation of our conclusions.   
4.2 Matching estimates  
                                                 
12 Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), to reduce this potential source of bias, we have also run 
regressions by excluding the few countries with less than 20 annual observations. These additional results 
are qualitatively and quantitatively closed with those reported in Table 3.     18
The results presented above already give important insights on the role that change in 
political regime may have on the level of agricultural protection. However, having in 
mind caveats with respect to difference-in-difference methods we proceed to results 
obtained from semi-parametric methods.  
The coefficients of the probit models that were used to calculate propensity scores are 
presented in Table 4. The first two columns give the results for democratic transition 
sample whereas the two latter ones give the results for the autocratic transition sample. 
The presented results indicate that the probability of shifting towards democracy 
(autocracy) increases (decreases) with the level of economic development. In addition, 
transitions from democracy to autocracy are the more likely the lower the initial value of 
polity2 variable. In general the chosen covariates predict shift towards autocracy much 
better than transition in opposite direction, as suggested by the pseudo R
2 equal to 0.51-
0.52 and 0.23-0.24, respectively.  
In order to check the goodness of matching we compared the distribution of observed 
covariates between the countries in the treated group and the control group. The results 
are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Clearly, matching did well in terms of removing significant 
differences between treated and control countries especially in autocratic sample. As 
regards transitions to democracy on the other hand, the treated and control groups already 
before matching are not so different. Nevertheless, it seems that matching may still be 
relevant here since it removes the difference in means of dummy for Africa, and reduces 
the differences in means of relative GDP and conflict years.  
The results of matching are displayed in Table 7. Before analysing them it is important 
to keep in mind the main advantage (and some caveats) of implementing matching over 
difference-in-difference regressions (Persson and Tabellini, 2007). Basically, with 
matching we relax linearity, allowing for any heterogeneity in the effect of democracy on 
protection. However, there is a cost: the estimates are less efficient and, due to the few 
usable observations in our hand, the loss in precision is a matter of fact. However and 
interestingly, it seems that matching estimates are fully in line with the results obtained 
from the standard difference-in-difference method. That is, the effect of transition to 
democracy on the level of agricultural protection is strongly positive and statistically 
significant whereas the effect of transition to autocracy does not differ from zero. 
Moreover, the effect of democracy in NRA sample is larger than that observed when using 
RRA sample. What is worth noting is the fact that point estimates obtained by matching 
are larger than that estimated using difference-in-difference method. To see this, compare   19
matching results with the difference-in-difference benchmark reported in Table 2 (column 
2 for NRA, and column 7 for RRA). Matching estimates oscillate in the region of 14% and 
9% whereas the parametric ones are 10% and 4.8% for NRA and RRA respectively. This 
suggests that previous parametric methods could have underestimated the true effect of 
democracy on the level of agricultural protection.  
What might be also noted is that, contrary to difference-in-difference method, using 
matching and NRA sample, point estimates of the impact of transition towards autocracy 
are positive, although insignificant. This again rises the question whether the former 
approach does not underestimate the true effect of regime transition. Possible explanation 
for positive effect of autocratic transition could draw on the so-called ‘divide-and-rule’ 
strategy adopted by the autocratic ruler who bribes politically pivotal groups so to ensure 
he can stay in power (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2004). Important to note here is that, 
limited by the macrosetting, our matching estimates are based on relatively small sample.  
Overall, the matching evidence reinforce our finding of the existence of a positive 
effect of democratic transitions on agricultural protection. On the other hand, we found no 
evidence that agricultural distortions are affected by autocratic transitions.  
5. Conclusions  
Motivated by the recent developments in comparative politics about the effect of political 
institutions on public policy outcomes, we have investigated how transitions into 
democracy affect agricultural protection and support. The empirical results highlight the 
important role played by political regime transitions in affecting agricultural policy 
distortions. In particular, using panel data analysis and differences-in-differences 
estimation, alone and combined with semi-parametric matching methods, we documented 
a significant positive effect of a democratic transition on agricultural protection. More 
specifically, we showed that transition to democracy increases agricultural protection by 
roughly 9% when propensity score matching methods were used and by roughly 5% when 
difference-in-difference approach was employed. These results point to an important 
conclusion that parametric methods might have underestimated the true effect of 
democratic transitions on the level of agricultural distortions. Interestingly, no effect of 
transition to autocracy was found regardless of the specification and approach used.  
Overall, these results support the notion that democracy does matter in affecting the 
adoption of structural policies. Furthermore, because in countries undergoing democratic 
transitions it is probable to find many farmer incomes at the median income level, our   20
evidence gives support to the idea that a process of democratization is followed by 
redistribution toward the majority and, therefore, it is not inconsistent with the median 
voter model of political behavior. Finally, our evidence rises the important question 
whether the strong taxation/subsidization switch induced on agricultural policy by 
democratization, could represent one of the channels through which democracy exerts its 
positive effect on growth. 
Several further improvements should be made to better understand the interaction 
between institutions and agricultural policy distortions. For example, just to cite one 
potential direction, this paper has focused on the role of democracy in general. Therefore, 
possible extension could explore the potential importance of various forms of democracy, 
i.e. importance of various electoral rules or various government structures. Extension into 
these and other directions could significantly improve our understanding of the interlink 
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the (simple) yearly average of NRA, calculated across democratic and 
autocratic countries. A country in a given year is classified as a democracy if variable Polity2 in the Polity IV data set is 
greater than zero (see text). 





Table 1.  NRA over time and political regimes 
  Full sample  Autocracy Democracy 
1955-1959 0.41  -0.13 0.66 
1960-1964 0.28  -0.16 0.54 
1965-1969 0.27  -0.13 0.51 
1970-1974 0.10  -0.24 0.46 
1975-1979 0.10  -0.23 0.44 
1980-1984 0.09  -0.22 0.38 
1985-1989 0.29  -0.06 0.59 
1990-1994 0.23  -0.14 0.41 
1995-1999 0.19  -0.13 0.28 
2000-2005 0.20  -0.08 0.26 
      
All years  0.21  -0.15  0.45 
N. Countries  74  39  67 
Notes: The figures report simple NRA average across autocracies and democracies 
in different sub-periods. The number of countries refers to ‘total presences’ in each 
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Table 2. Democracy and agricultural protection, difference-in-difference estimates 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable    NRA NRA NRA NRA RRA RRA RRA RRA 
            
Democracy     14.00 10.17 15.73 -2.53  9.51  4.80  9.62  0.71 
   (2.09)*** (2.34)*** (2.60)***  (4.95)  (1.99)*** (2.52)* (2.51)***  (4.41) 
   [4.62]*** [5.37]* [5.66]***  [5.66]  [4.43]**  [5.53]  [5.37]*  [6.38] 
           
Treatment (transition to)    Democracy 
and autocracy 
Democracy Democracy  Autocracy  Democracy 
and autocracy 
Democracy Democracy  Autocracy 
           
Control group (permanent)    Autocracy and 
democracy 
Autocracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Democracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Autocracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Democracy 
            
Continent-year  mummie    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations    2565 1176 2290 1506 2314  987  2065 1444 
Number  of  countries    74 38 73 51 69 33 68 50 
R
2  (within)      0.34 0.59 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.56 0.35 0.31 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; in bracket robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include: Log of GDP per capita, Log of population, agricultural 
employment share, land per capita, year and country fixed effects, and interaction effects between continents (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and year dummies. (See text).  
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.   
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Table 3. Democracy and agricultural protection, difference-in-difference estimates: dynamic model 
Regression      (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable    NRA NRA NRA NRA RRA RRA RRA RRA 
            
Democracy   4.70 4.70 5.18  0.875  3.75 3.26 4.02 0.00 
   (1.34)*** (1.78)*** (1.64)***  (3.02)  (1.27)*** (1.79)*  (1.55)**  (2.87) 
   [1.34]***  [2.11]**  [1.57]*** [1.83] [1.34]*** [2.00]  [1.56]**  (1.76) 
           
Lagged protection    0.77 0.66 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.77 
   (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** 
   [0.03]*** [0.05]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.06]*** [0.02]*** [0.04]*** 
            
Treatment (transition to)    Democracy 
and autocracy 
Democracy Democracy  Autocracy  Democracy 
and autocracy 
Democracy Democracy  Autocracy 
           
Control group (permanent)    Autocracy and 
democracy 
Autocracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Democracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Autocracy Autocracy  and 
democracy 
Democracy 
            
Continent-year  dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations    2529 1158 2258 1488 2278  972  2034 1423 
Number  of  countries    74 38 73 51 69 33 68 50 
R
2  (within)      0.73 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.75 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; in bracket robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions, other than variables reported in the table, include the following 
controls: Log of GDP per capita, Log of population, agricultural employment share, land per capita, year and country fixed effects, and interaction effects between continents 
(Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and year dummies. (See text).  
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.   
   29
 
Table 4. Estimates of the propensity score 
   Transitions to democracy  Transitions to autocracy 
   RRA  NRA RRA NRA 
Initial polity2  0.07 0.09  -0.25 -0.25 
  (0.77) (1.03) (1.99)**  (1.91)* 
Relative GDP  25.17 35.77 -17.27 -17.30 
  (1.84)* (1.73)* (2.28)** (2.30)** 
Sample length  0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.13) (1.75)*  (.65)  (.53) 
Conflict years  3.30  0.85 0.18 0.11 
  (1.77)*  (0.84) (0.17) (0.11) 
Constant  -0.38  2.17 2.70 2.61 
  (0.36) (1.72)* (2.34)**  (2.28)** 
Observations  33  38 49 49 
Pseudo R
2  0.23  0.24 0.52 0.51 
Notes: t-values in parentheses: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.      30
Table 5. Transitions to democracies: balancing properties 
      RRA NRA 
Variable    Mean t-test  Mean  t-test 
   Sample  Treated  Control  t-value p > |t|  Treated Control  t-value  p > |t|
                  
Relative GDP  Unmatched 0.065 0.026 1.19 0.242 0.062 0.022 1.47 0.150
  Matched 0.031  0.035 -0.58 0.577 0.021 0.023  -0.29 0.776
                  
Initial polity2  Unmatched -5.538 -5.714 0.13 0.899 -5.464 -6.000  0.46 0.645
  Matched -4.000  -5.694 0.90 0.395 -5.700 -6.342 0.51 0.619
                  
Sample length  Unmatched 33.23 32.00 0.24 0.813 33.79 36.90 -0.80 0.426
  Matched 35.80  42.29 -0.84 0.423 37.00 37.18  -0.04 0.967
                  
Conflict years  Unmatched 0.246 0.127 1.01 0.322 0.229 0.202 0.26 0.799
  Matched 0.089  0.091 -0.02 0.985 0.176 0.189  -0.12 0.905
                  
Latin America  Unmatched 0.230 0.000 1.40 0.170 0.214 0.000 1.61 0.117
  Matched 0.400  0.000 1.63 0.141 0.100 0.000  1.00 0.331
                  
Asia  Unmatched 0.269 0.285 -0.08 0.933 0.250 0.200 0.31 0.757
  Matched 0.000  0.000 .  .  0.100 0.206  -0.63 0.535
                  
Africa  Unmatched 0.423 0.714 -1.37 0.182 0.464 0.800 -1.87 0.070
   Matched 0.600  1.000 -1.63 0.141 0.800 0.794  0.03 0.974
See text 
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Table 6. Transitions to autocracy: balancing properties 
      RRA NRA 
Variable  Sample  Mean t-test  Mean  t-test 
      Treated  Control  t-value p > |t|  Treated Control  t-value  p > |t| 
                  
Relative GDP  Unmatched 0.035 0.366 -3.40 0.001 0.035 0.366  -3.40 0.001
  Matched 0.056  0.056 0.01 0.991 0.056 0.055  0.04 0.969
                  
Initial polity2  Unmatched 5.000 8.675 -5.14 0.000 5.000 8.540  -4.94 0.000
  Matched 5.000  5.661 -0.42 0.684 5.000 5.688  -0.44 0.672
                  
Sample length  Unmatched 25.00 34.87 -1.76 0.085 25.08 35.76  -2.08 0.043
  Matched 27.00  18.13 1.54 0.162 27.00 18.50  1.58 0.153
                  
Conflict years  Unmatched 0.368 0.141 2.40 0.020 0.368 0.140 2.40 0.021
  Matched 0.213  0.1 0.67 0.522 0.213 0.100  0.67 0.521
                  
Latin America  Unmatched 0.083 0.054 0.36 0.720 0.083 0.054 0.36 0.720
  Matched 0.200  0.000 1.00 0.347 0.200 0.000  1.00 0.347
                  
Asia  Unmatched 0.333 0.135 1.55 0.129 0.333 0.135 1.55 0.129
  Matched 0.200  0.240 -0.140 0.893 0.200 0.243  -0.15 0.885
                  
Africa  Unmatched 0.583 0.027 5.82 0.000 0.583 0.027 5.82 0.000
   Matched 0.600  0.006 2.39 0.044 0.600 0.005  2.40 0.043
See text 
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Table 7. Matching estimates of the protection effect of becoming a democracy (autocracy)  
   NRA RRA 
  Going to democracy  Going to autocracy  Going to democracy  Going to autocracy 
   (5) (6) (7) (8) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Growth in agric. 
protection  14.63 13.95  3.18  2.9  9.72  9.25  0.17  0.76 
Std. Error               
lower bound  (7.84)* (7.88)* (16.67) (17.49) (5.67)*  (5.79)  (18.30)  (18.91) 
Std. error               
upper bound  (8.04)* (8.08)* (18.77) (20.45) (6.05)  (6.48)  (19.92)  (23.21) 
















No. of  treated 
countries  10  10  5  5  5 5 5 5 
No. of control 
countries 10  10  37  37  7  7  37  37 
No. of controls with 
repetitions  79 100 48 185 32  35  48  185 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses), in the upper raw are estimated assuming independent observations, whereas standard errors in the  
lower raw are estimated assuming perfect correlations of repeated observations in control countries (see Persson and Tabellini, 2007 for details). 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.    33
 
 
Table A1. Country sample and democratic (autocratic) reform episodes 
     Coverage Democratic  reforms Polity2 Protection  average 
    Country  Start   End  Into  Out  Average  RRA  NRA 
1 Argentina  1960  2005  1973;  1983  1976  1.0 -30.8 -18.5
2 Australia  1955  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0  -5.1  5.9
3  Austria  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 27.3 32.2
4 Bangladesh  1974  2004  1991   0.4  -21.0  0.0
5 Benin  1970  2005  1991   -1.6    -27.8
6 Brazil  1966  2005  1985    1.7 -26.6 -15.6
7 Bulgaria  1992  2005  Permanent democracy  -2.2  -6.1  -10.2
8 Burkina  Faso  1970  2005  1977  1980  -4.5    -28.3
9 Cameroon  1961  2005  Permanent autocracy  -6.4  -30.8  -9.1
10  Canada  1961  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 16.9 15.8
11 Chad  1970  2005  Permanent autocracy  -5.3    -26.5
12 Chile  1960  2005  1989 1973  2.7 -5.8  5.7
13 China  1981  2005  Permanent  autocracy -7.5 -26.2 -19.3
14 Colombia  1960  2005  Permanent  democracy  7.0  -10.7  1.4
15  Cote  d'Ivoire  1961  2005  2000  2002  -7.0 -42.5 -31.9
16 Czech  Republic  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  -1.6 12.9 14.1
17  Denmark  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 48.0 52.9
18 Dominican  Rep.  1955  2005  1978    2.0 -16.9 -10.0
19 Ecuador  1970  2003  1968; 1979 1970  3.9  -11.4  -6.1
20 Egypt  1955  2005  Permanent  autocracy -6.4 -32.3 -14.7
21 Estonia  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  6.0  17.6  7.0
22 Ethiopia  1981  2005  1994    -5.5 -50.0 -11.9
23  Finland  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 64.5 74.7
24  France  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  7.9 47.3 62.2
25  Germany  1955  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 61.2 70.2
26 Ghana  1960  2004  1970; 1979; 1996 1972; 1981  -2.9 -23.6 -16.0
27  Hungary  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  -1.2 14.8 16.2
28 India  1960  2005  Permanent  democracy  8.6  -29.4  6.2
29 Indonesia  1970  2005  1999   -4.5  -15.5  3.0
30  Ireland  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 59.7 70.0
31  Italy  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 41.1 44.7
32 Japan  1955  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0  85.4  110.1
33  Kenya  1966  2001  2002  1966  -3.6 -14.6 -14.8
34 Korea  South  1955  2005  1963; 1987  1972  0.5 81.6  103.5
35  Latvia  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  8.0 26.8 13.6
36  Lithuania  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 23.2 10.5
37 Madagascar  1960  2005  1991    -0.1 -32.6 -20.5
38  Malaysia  1960  2005  Permanent  democracy  5.1 -8.5 -4.5
39 Mali  1970  2005  1992   -2.8    -33.8
40 Mexico  1979  2005  1994    -1.7 4.2 7.6
41 Morocco  1961  2004  Permanent autocracy  -7.1  -25.4  -8.6
42 Mozambique  1975  2005  1994    -2.2 -43.9 -28.9
43  Netherlands  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 67.0 78.5
44 New  Zealand  1955  2005  Permanent democracy  10.0  -9.6  6.6
45  Nicaragua  1991  2004  1990    -1.9 -11.9 -11.4  34
46 Nigeria  1961  2004  1979; 1999  1966; 1984  -1.4 26.7  7.2
47  Norway  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 196.7 242.5
48 Pakistan  1962  2005  1972; 1988 1969;  1977; 1999 0.3 -37.9  -3.2
49 Philippines  1962  2005  1987 1972  2.3 -2.2 11.7
50 Poland  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  -1.8  8.3  12.3
51 Portugal  1956  2005  1975    2.4 -1.2 -0.2
52  Romania 1992  2005  Permanent  democracy -2.7  26.8  31.3
53  R. South Africa  1961  2005  Permanent democracy  5.3  6.2  9.2
54  Russia  1992  2005 Permanent  democracy  5.4 1.3 3.2
55 Senegal  1961  2005  2000    -1.8 -21.3 -14.2
56 Slovakia  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  8.1  8.8  18.6
57  Slovenia  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 65.3 66.0
58 Spain  1955  2005  1976    2.7 13.7 16.1
59  Srilanka  1955  2004  Permanent  democracy  6.2 -44.2 -13.6
60 Sudan  1958  2004  1965; 1986  1958; 1970; 1989 -3.6 -32.5 -33.3
61  Sweden  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 76.4 85.3
62  Switzerland  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 283.5 324.7
63 Taiwan  1955  2002  1992    -2.5 15.8 53.2
64 Tanzania  1976  2004  2000    -5.1 -57.1 -43.7
65 Thailand  1978  2004  1974;  1978  1976  1.1  -12.9  -6.3
66 Togo  1970  2005  Permanent autocracy  -5.3    -31.3
67  Turkey  1961  2005  1973; 1983  1971; 1980  6.4  -13.9  4.1
68 Uganda  1961  2004  1980  1966; 1985  -3.0 -35.9  -7.9
69  UK  1956  2005  Permanent  democracy  10.0 49.0 66.1
70  Ukraine  1992  2005  Permanent  democracy  6.3 -13.6 -11.4
71  USA  1955  2005 Permanent  democracy  10.0 7.2 8.4
72 Vietnam  1986  2005  Permanent  autocracy  -6.4 -8.5 -3.1
73 Zambia  1964  2005  1991 1968 -2.5 -51.9 -40.1
74 Zimbabwe  1970  2005      1987  -1.7 -62.5 -48.1
Notes: The Table reports sample characteristics (columns 1-2); the classification of democratic (autocratic) reform 
episodes and political regimes (columns 3-4); the average Polity2 index of democracy in the respective observed period 
(column 5); and finally the overage level of the two protection indices (columns 6-7). Bold numbers in columns 3-4 
refer to reform episodes that satisfy the criteria requested and thus are those used in the estimation of the democracy 
effect. (See text).      